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CHAIRMAN'S
MESSAGE

T

hese are (to use the phrase which, as I
understand it, the Chinese wish upon
someone as a curse), "interesting times" for
those of us who practice or teach in the field of
administrative law. What seemed, during the
days when I was in law school, an obscure and
arcane area of practice is now often the focus
of articles in the daily newspapers and popular journals. In the early 1970s, when I served
for a time as Chairman of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, it was difANTONIN SCALIA
ficult to attract any congressional attention to major problems of administrative procedure. Indeed, as I recall, many of those congressmen
who knew about the APA persisted in calling it the Administrative
Procedures Act. The Washington Post ran an article during those years
on "do-nothing" units of Congress-committees and subcommittees
that served as sinecures for staff members devoted to "constituentcare" or other political purposes; high on the list was a subcommittee
charged with responsibility for matters of administrative procedure.
What a change there has been! Committees with responsibility for
procedural reform are at the center of the political stage, and from
congressional lips there falls not merely a correct pronunciation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) but a whole new vocabulary of
what might be called admin-chic-"regulatory impact analysis" (or, for
those really au courant, simply "RIA"), "periodic review," "legislative
veto," "sunset," "two-stage rulemaking," "Bumpers," "Baby Bumpers,"
"regulatory budget," etc.
It is a period of ferment that can only realistically be compared with
the era that gave birth to the APA some thirty-five years ago. The
Supreme Court described that Act, not long after it was passed, as
legislation that "settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions,
and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces
have come to rest."' That description was repeated as recently as 1978,
'Won Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
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in the Vermont Yankee case;2 but it should be apparent today that the
state of rest has become disturbed. Expanding upon more limited
efforts by his two immediate predecessors, the President has placed in
effect what might be considered a mini-APA by Executive Order
12291, applicable to rulemaking throughout the executive branch.
And committees of both houses of Congress are in the midst of considering major revisions of the APA itself, which appear certain to be
enacted this year or next in some form.
It is interesting to compare the procedural reform movement of
1981 with its 1946 counterpart. Both followed an era of extraordinary
expansion in federal agency power and activity. The APA dealt with
the NLRBs, CABs, FCCs, SECs, and FDICs created by the prior decade
of the New Deal. The Regulatory Reform Acts of 1981 deal with them
plus the EPAs, OSHAs, CPSCs, NHTSBs and CFTCs created during
the regulatory explosion of the 1970s. Both represent, it is fair to say, a
reaction against what were (or are) regarded as administrative excesses
of the recent past.
Both reforms required a lengthy incubation period, and changed
form considerably over the course of their development. The movement that culminated in the APA began with proposals for an administrative court that appear as early as 1933;1 an early (and still highly
"judicialized") version of the act, the Logan-Walter bill, 4 was passed by
both houses of Congress in 1940, only to be vetoed by President
Roosevelt.' By the time the legislation was finally enacted in 1946, its
legislative history, officially published in a Senate Document compiled
by the Judiciary Committee,6 was deceptively brief, because so many of
the important hearings had been held in earlier sessions, with respect
to different bills. The Regulatory Reform Act of 1981 (or 1982) will
have undergone a similar process of gradual evolution. It is part of a
legislative movement that can be traced back to 1975 and 1976, which
saw proposals subjecting all agency regulations to legislative veto7 and
to "sunset review."' Those first-conceived features, like the administrative court in the case of the APA, may well not appear in the final
legislation.
2
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978).
IS.
1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1936).
4
H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
186 CONG. REc. 13842 (1940).
6S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (hereinafter cited as Legislative History).
7
H.R. 3658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
'S. 2925, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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Both reform movements sought relief from agency excesses in the
courts, through proposals for more intensive judicial review. (This is
curious with respect to the current reform, since in other fields Congress appears displeased with the performance of the Third Branch,
and is considering elimination of federal-court jurisdiction.)9 And
finally (but this is not at all curious), both then and now the new
proposals have received at best half-hearted support from the agencies
to whose procedures they are directed.
But there are two differences between the reforms of 1946 and 1981
that are, it seems to me, important and perhaps portentious. First, the
degree of Executive involvement in their formulation. While one cannot avoid the impression that the Executive of yore was not eager, no
more than today, to have its procedural options curtailed, when the
inevitable arrived it at least saw to the development and presentation of
a thoroughly documented, expert analysis of the major issues, which
became the focus of the congressional debate. One reason the President gave for vetoing the 1940 bill was to enable consideration of the
still-pending report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure
appointed by Attorney General Jackson, at the President's direction,
earlier that year.' ° The committee's Final Report was issued about a
month later" and, it is fair to say, dominated subsequent consideration
of the subject. Individual agencies also took an active role in the
legislative process: in connection with the 1941 hearings, at least thirtyfive separate agencies made oral or written presentations;' 2 two rounds
of agency comments were again solicited by the Judiciary Committees
in 1945;'" and in the 1945 HouseJudiciary Committee hearings, almost4
two days of testimony were devoted to Commissioners of the ICC.
The current situation presents a stark contrast to this Executive
leadership and individual agency involvement. While the last three
Presidents have spoken in favor of regulatory reform-and the last two
campaigned in favor of it-almost none of the features of the present
bills represent Executive-generated proposals or initiatives; and some,
such as the legislative veto of rulemaking and the Bumpers Amendment concerning judicial review, have been opposed by successive
administrations. (So-called "regulatory impact analysis" is, to be sure,
9
See, e.g., the following bills currently under consideration (all 97th Cong., 1st Sess.):
H.R. 867 (abortion); S. 1647 (busing); H.R. 72 (school prayer).

1086 CONG. REC. 13943 (1940).
"FINAL

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

COMMITTEE ON

ADMINISTRATIVE

(1941).
PROCEDURE
2
SLegislative History at 247.

"Id. at 248.
"Id. at 87-128.
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not only favored but was conceived of by the Executive-but not its
embodiment in rigid statutory form.) No "administration bill" has been
introduced, and the administration "version" circulated informally is
obviously an ad hoc reaction to a legislative agenda congressionally
prescribed. The degree of individual agency involvement in the process is suggested by a recent acknowledgement on the part of the
Administrator of OSHA-surely one of the agencies most affectedthat he was uninformed concerning the proposed increased formalization of rulemaking procedures. The difference between then and
now in this regard may be entirely understandable; one would not
expect a new Republican Administration to have as clear a position on
these matters--or as much time to develop a position-as a Democratic
Administration that had been in office (by the time the APA was
enacted) for fourteen years. But the difference is nonetheless significant, and must suggest that the implications of the proposals for the
agencies have not been as thoroughly considered.
There is another striking contrast between the APA and its pending
modern revision. The APA was preeminently lawyers' legislation. The
prime factor in its enactment was unquestionably the American Bar
Association, which in 1933 had created a Special Committee on Administrative Law to work on the perceived problems of administrative
justice. 6 (That Committee may, by the way, be considered the ancestor
of our Section of Administrative Law, which was founded in the year
the APA was enacted. I am anxious to claim descendence because it was
an eminent group, including from its founding such giants in American law as Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter.) The Logan-Walter
bill vetoed by President Roosevelt in 1940 was an ABA proposal, 7 as
was the McCarran-Sumners bill that ultimately (with some revision)
became the APA.' The President of the ABA was the first witness in
the 1945 House Judiciary Committee hearings, 9 and an article by the
"5 Conversation with Thorne G. Auchter, sponsored by American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 25, 1981.
6
For a description of the formation and activities of the Special Committee, see
Legislative History at 63-66. The membership of the Special Committee through 1940
appears in Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 937 (1941).
"See Legislative History at 64. President Roosevelt's veto message paid
backhanded tribute to the role of the bar by noting that "a large part of the legal
profession has never reconciled itself to the existence of the administrative
tribunal," and prefers instead "the stately ritual of the courts, in which lawyers play
all the speaking parts" and "technical rules of evidence in which the lawyers are the
only experts, although they always disagree." 86 CONG. REC. 13942-43 (1940). One
sees in this the sharp pen of Attorney General Jackson.
sSee Legislative History at 66.
'9ld. at 48.
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next President of the ABA-read by the Clerk of the Senate at the
request of Sen. McCarran-began the Senate debate. " On the government side, the legislative battle was also conducted by lawyers. The
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, whose
1941 report profoundly affected the ABA's ultimate position, was
chaired by Dean Acheson and numbered among its members Francis
Biddle (later Attorney General), Arthur Vanderbilt, Ralph Fuchs,
Henry Hart and Carl McFarland (later Chairman of the ABA Special
Committee). Its Director was the former Council Member of this
Section, Walter Gellhorn.2 ' In the legislative process it was the Justice
position and coorDepartment that enunciated the Administrations's
22
agencies.
other
of
views
the
dinated
It is different with the Regulatory Reform Act of 1981. The ABA
has, to be sure, had considerable influence in generating and shaping
reform initiatives through its Commission on Law and the Economy, its
Coordinating Group on Regulatory Reform and (I must modestly add)
its Section of Administrative Law. But none of the proposals currently
pending could remotely be described as an "ABA bill"; and business
associations-in particular the Business Roundtable-have had at least
an equivalent role in bringing this legislation to the floor. On the
government side, the contrast is even more striking: It is the Office of
Management and Budget rather than the Department of Justice that
has taken the lead in coordinating agencies' views (insofar as that has
been done) and presenting the Administration's position. And indeed,
to the extent any major features of the present legislative proposals can
be said to have originated with the Executive Branch, it is with the
economists and managers at OMB who devised Exec. Order No.
12,291 rather than with the lawyers atJustice. To be sure, OMB has its
own fine lawyers as well-and doubtless has made use of the legal talent
of the Justice Department. But they have been at most the midwife,
and not the mother, of reform.
This phenomenon is traceable, I think, to the fact that the impetus
behind the current reform movement is less distinctively legal, and
more commercial or economic, than it was in 1946. In the debate
preceding adoption of the APA, concepts such as "unfairness," "bias"
and "prejudice" played a prominent role. Those concerns are not
entirely absent in 1981, but notions such as "overregulation" and

10ld. at 295.
"For the membership of the Committee see

FINAL REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE iV (1941).

"See, e.g., Legislative History at 249.
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"cost-effectiveness" are the rallying point. Such issues are not the
lawyer's stock in trade.
It is not clear to me whether the reduced role of our profession in the
current reform should be cause for satisfaction or concern. There is
much to be said for the proposition that-just as war is too important to
be left to the generals-administrative procedure is too important to be
left to the lawyers. But that truth can be pursued to a fault. The fact is
that even if the goals are commercial and economic, when they are
sought to be achieved through process it is lawyers, rather than economists or businessmen, who are (or are at least supposed to be) the
experts. They have, if nothing else, an intimate familiarity with the
manner in which the process can be used or abused by their own kind.
The job they did last time around was, after all, not bad. A thirty-fiveyear life span for a procedural "formula upon which opposing social
and political forces have come to rest" is quite respectable in a field that
has changed as rapidly as federal administration. There may be reason
to fear that the product produced in 1981 will be less enduring.
The interest of the laity in administrative process, which now seems
so flattering, may prove to be a bane. It is, come to think of it, extraordinary that a Congress bent upon major substantive change in the
nature and scope of regulation would turn, not to the substantive
statutes in question, but to the basic framework of administrative
procedure. Early in this century, Sir Henry Maine called attention to
the fact that substantive law is sometimes "secreted in the interstices of
procedure.1 2 It is a profound insight-and perhaps as dangerous as

the Knowledge of Good and Evil. In recent years, we seem to have let
the secret (expanded somewhat beyond Maine's original meaning) leak
out beyond our legal fraternity, so that the world at large-yea, even
the Business Roundtable-has lost its innocence, and realizes that the
politically simplest way to alter substance is to alter process. I fear we
must get used to having more players on our field-and perhaps to
"interesting times" for administrative procedure into the indefinite
future.

23

1SIR HENRY MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM

389 (1907).
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